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Abstract 
In this paper, we formulate a political system that can satisfy certain desirable characteristics 
that include democratic participation, serving for universal interest, public sector efficiency, 
and sustainable by incentive compatibility and virtuous cycles. The system comprises a set of 
rules and organizations that provide motivations and supports to the participants for 
enhancing universal interest. It is a political structure that serves the people, rules by 
rationality, strives for efficiency and is sustainable. They will drive the society toward 
harmony and rapid growth in the quality of life for all. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1  The Nature of Politics 
Every community must find some rules to solve the allocation of coercive force 
and scarce resources effectively for achieving internal stability. A political system or polity is 
characterized by its rules determining the allocation of coercive force. We call these rules the 
primary institution. The secondary institution is defined as the rules governing market and 
social interactions. In this paper, we propose a design for the structure of primary institution 
and associated organizations for attaining some desirable social outcomes. The design is 
called Rational Democracy. When the coercive force of a polity comes from the governed 
people, we call the polity a democratic system. When the force comes from owning a coercive 
organization, we call the polity a dictatorship in which people have no say on the exercise of 
the government coercive force. In the real world, there is a continuous spectrum in between 
the two extremes. In democratic systems, we have direct democracy and representative 
democracy. In dictatorship regimes, we have monarchy and oligarchy. Also, some autocratic 
polities are more responsive to the needs of its people while some are totally exploitative. 
The foundation on which a state can govern is its coercive force. The coercive 
force appears in the form of army, police, laws, prison and judicial system. The functioning 
and outcomes of any market system depend on the definition, structure and enforcement of 
private property rights which in turn depend on the allocation of coercive force. At the level of 
political activities, all resources are common properties in the sense that any private property 
and/or its income can be transformed to common property through political actions. That is, 
the allocation of private property rights and/or income distribution, and in general, the pattern 
of secondary institutions and organizations are determined by the method of allocating 
coercive force.1 An ideal political system comprises a set of institutions that encourage 
political agents and organizations to engage in activities that can enhance universal interest. 
                                                 
1 For some historical examples how the primary institution determine the secondary institutions, please refer to 
Mo (1995, 2004, 2007), among many others. 
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That is, a polity that can enhance long-run social and economic development with an 
expansion of consumption possibility set for all people. They are the essence of universal 
interest in all societies. 
 
1.2 Special Interest Politics 
 Universal benevolence does not allow special benevolence. -- Zhuang_Zi 
The survival of a state and the wellbeing of its people rely on the provision of 
some essential public goods like definition of private property rights and contract enforcement 
in order to facilitate orderly production, division of labor and exchanges. All property right 
allocation and income distribution are backed up by coercive force. Political power is the 
power to use coercive force. This posts a long-lasting dilemma facing every community. 
Without a king, government, polity or political system, whatever you call it, a community will 
be in chaos when private property and income is undefined, weak and not protected. Division 
of labor and trade will be difficult and constantly resorting to violent struggle makes every 
member desolate. However, government empowered with the use of violence generates a 
constant temptation to the incumbents to exploit the public by exercising its coercive force. 
Historically, the natural way to allocate coercive force is through competition among fighting 
organizations. The winner becomes the designer of the primary and secondary institutions. 
Normally, the dominant goal of the winner is to maintain and exercise its political power for 
its own benefit and put the wellbeing of the commons under a minor consideration. The 
behavior of exploitative governments could result in decline of nations and civilizations.2 
Compared to the primitive method of allocating coercive force through 
physical struggles, democracy is an ingenious device to solve many undesirable effects 
associated with dictatorship. In democratic nations, the political power of the government is 
delegated by the people and it should serve the people. The understanding is usually explicitly 
                                                 
2 For instance, Mo (1995, 2004). 
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written down in a constitution. Organizations and mechanisms are set up to check and balance 
the political power of the government. There is substantial consensus that Western democracy 
has ensured the control of the state’s absolute power through voting system, written 
constitution, and the rule of law. In combination, they can constrain the state’s coercive force 
as well as the tyranny of the majority.  
Democracy can therefore resolve the dilemma in allocating political power to 
the state. In the modern world, there are different types of democratic regimes. However, they 
are all based on the electoral process for allocating political power. We call the regimes 
electoral democracy. They allocate votes evenly to the public de facto turns the resources of 
the society into common properties of the eligible public who attempt to expropriate the 
largest share of income by their voting power. Parties, special interest groups and their allies 
are formed with strategic actions to compete for the common properties allocated by political 
power and/or to transform existing private properties/incomes into common properties 
available for political expropriation.3 Resources in the form of government spending and 
non-represented interests are allocated to benefit constituents of politicians in order to trade 
for their political supports, either in the form of campaign contributions or votes. Minimum 
wages allocate production surplus in favor of the existing labor concerned at the expense of 
the producers, unemployed and future labor. The political pressures from the special interests 
force electoral democratic governments to constantly raise taxes, borrow and print money. 
The role of market in allocating resources, the money rewards from productive activities and 
the work ethic are diminished by higher taxation and arbitrary income distribution politics. 
Finally, people develop a habit of dependency on the state for jobs, housing and welfare.4 The 
welfare state also distracts the government from its essential functions – infrastructures, law 
and order, diplomacy and defense, which results in degradation in the political, social and 
                                                 
3 The increasing size of taxes and government expenditures in typical democratic countries can be interpreted as 
a process of transforming private properties to common properties available to be expropriated by interest groups 
through political process which is damaging to the long run wellbeing of a society. (for instance, Mo, 2007a) 
4 For instance, Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006), McDougall (1921), among many others. 
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economic spheres. 
The dismal history of modern sub-Saharan Africa is an indication of our 
inadequate knowledge of electoral democracy and the politics of economic development. 
Chua (2003) documents the instabilities caused by the conflicts between free market resource 
allocation and coercive force allocation under electoral voting systems. She concludes that if 
democracy and markets are to be peaceably sustainable, democratization cannot be reduced to 
shipping out ballot boxes for national elections – in the process political leaders whip up mass 
hatred against the resented minority, and stir up class, ethnic and religious politics in deeply 
divided societies. Poor voters have no incentive and also lack of access to information while 
incumbents empowered with superior resources and power control the political process 
through lobbying and corruption. These problems aggravate the conflicts among income 
classes, and/or among people of different ethnic and religious origins. In rich countries with 
enlightened citizens, polities based on special interest competition resolve the conflicts by 
voting and government redistributions. In poor countries with low-educated public, special 
interest competition in electoral democracy results in unceasing conflicts, violence and 
disasters. 
 
2. The Structure of Universal Interest Polity 
Universal virtue cannot be accomplished unless special virtues are ignored. --  Lao Zi 
Specific interests tend to be diverse and therefore pervasive conflicts of 
interests arise during the competition for specific interests. Universal interests based on Pareto 
improvements, on the other hand, can be narrowly identified and consensus based on 
universal interests can be relatively easy to be arrived at under proper mechanism.5 Rules of 
interactions influence outcomes. This implies that we can design rules of social interactions 
for attaining some socially desirable outcomes. Historically, primary institutions in modern 
                                                 
5 However, it does not mean that universal interests can be easily achieved. The Prisoner Dilemma Game is the 
standard example that illustrates proper institutions are essential for attaining outcome of universal interests. 
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societies embody the intentionality of the conscious mind. They are the structure of human 
creation for achieving some desirable targets. A polity that constrains sociopolitical 
interactions must be evaluated by its capacity to promote the universal interest of society and 
at the same time, to allow individuals to pursue their separate activities and purposes under 
defined private spaces. Moreover, the structure must be continually altered with changes in 
the fundamental factors like technology, information, and human capital in order to 
accomplish their intended functions. The following system is designed for the universal 
interests of the society and permits trial and error experiments to occur society-wide that 
promote advancements through adaptive efficiency. Figure 1 shows the structure of the 
rational democratic polity that will be discussed in details in the following sections. 
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Figure 1: The Structure of Universal Interest Polity 
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2.1. The Social Branches: Mimicking the Miracles of Competitive Market 
“Mere kindness cannot govern; mere laws will not be automatically enforced.” – Book of 
Mencius, Part 7. 
There are three vital spheres in every society. They are market, social and 
political. The mutual checks and supports among the spheres are essential for the 
advancements of every society. A major component in our design is to build up organizational 
stakeholders that will serve all the vital functions in a society. The related vested-interest 
groups developed in the organizations have strong incentive and sense of identity to maintain 
the structure. We call these organizations Pillars, Social Branches and Social Service 
Organizations (SSO). Once a mechanism for allocating political power is in place, related 
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organizations and activities will evolve intending to capture the potential benefits of accessing 
the political power. A desirable political system can induce the formation of related 
organizations, networks and activities that can serve the universal interests.  
Among the three spheres, the market system is self-organizing. Under some 
general conditions, the market system can harness self-interest of the participants and generate 
the outcomes that maximize the overall benefits of a community. In view of the effectiveness 
of the market system in enhancing economic development, its ability to generate useful 
knowledge and information, and its dynamic adjustment to changes, we attempt to design a 
political system mimicking and extending the influences of market mechanism on the society. 
Although market system can result in many desirable outcomes, it often generates an income 
distribution that may not be socially desirable. Moreover, goods and services that have 
spillover effects will not be optimally provided by market mechanism. In order to amend the 
potential undesirable effect and shortcomings of the market, setting up Social Branches by 
various market sectors is encouraged in order to provide platforms for directing the resources, 
networks and opinions generated from the market to the social sphere for promoting harmony 
and the universal interests of society. All Social Branches are obliged and supported to set up 
non-profit SSO that can receive matching grants from the government for their qualified 
social services. The Branches will be automatically recognized if the number of members in 
their SSO reaches certain qualified level or vice versa. In order to induce each Branch to 
extend their services to the poor and needy, the higher the total number of members in their 
SSO, the higher will be the rate of matching grants.6 Social services are defined as those 
services directly affecting the wellbeing and harmony of society but will not be optimally 
provided by the market. They include subsidies, supports and services to the poor, health care, 
education and training, micro-credits, recycling waste materials, environmental protection and 
                                                 
6 In a society with sufficient size, the dominance by a single or several social organizations is unlikely due to the 
increasing management costs and free-rider problems in social organizations. The matching formula can be 
adjusted to guarantee a contestable environment exists among SSO. 
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various social activities. The Branches are normally formed according to the leaders’ natural 
sense of identity and common interest. For instance, they can be the Social Branches of 
Financial Sector, Media, Industries, Education, Religion and rich families etc..7 The only rule 
governing their operations and activities is that their existence is for serving social benefits 
rather than pursuing their special interests and profits. However, Associations can be formed 
to pursue special interests but their leaders cannot become coercive force allocators (CFA) 
without passing through the channel of Social Branches. The objective of setting this rule is to 
make sure that the CFA in the Social Congress must possess certain desirable experiences and 
characteristics. In the next section, we will discuss this point in more detail. 
 Besides providing social services, the setting up of Social Branches and the 
related Directors can provide ample platforms for the riches, able and/or benevolent persons 
to serve society at their own will, while at the same time, nurture suitable candidates to serve 
in the Social Congress that allocates coercive power. In the process, the characteristics of the 
Directors in respective Branches and SSO will be revealed to their members, general public, 
market agents and political leaders. At the same time, serving in the Social Branches and SSO 
can provide training, experience, esteem and publicity for these potential CFA. Each Social 
Branch is a mini-government for providing various social services. The political connections 
and the possible access to the position of CFA will empower the Branch leaders with 
extensive supports from their market and political networks. In addition, the possibility of 
agency problems and rent-seeking activities in the Branches are constrained by the 
competitive environment among the SSO: the survival of Branches depends on the number of 
membership in their SSO which in turn depends on their efficiency and ability to cater the 
needs of a society that change over time. Similar to a competitive market system, the survival 
pressure generates the merits of self-regulating and creative dynamics in the social sphere.8 
                                                 
7 Other ‘natural’ Branches can be based on Agriculture, Commercial, Transportation, Technology, Real Estate 
and Health Care etc.. 
8 The Social Branch system establishes a market place for the ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ of esteem, in the terms of 
 10
 
2.2. Human Nature and the Ante-Incentive Effect 
“The best security for the fidelity of mankind is that interest be made coincident with duty.” -- 
James Madison. 
The study of modern economics is mostly concerned with material incentives 
and assuming the agents are egoists. This is because material incentives are the main form of 
incentives in the world of business and the incentive is pervasive among mortals. Instead of 
assuming homogeneous egoistic economic agents, we use a more realistic assumption of 
human nature that is commonly observed empirically and accepted in other disciplines. 
Besides the material rewards, it is commonly observed that ‘social-oriented’ people also 
concern about ‘social rewards’ that include being able to take care those in need, receiving 
public recognition, and attaining senses of identity, righteousness, distinction, 
self-actualization and so on. The existence of egoists and ‘socialists’ in a society implies that 
a reward structure not only alters the behavior of people in an organization, but will also 
select people of different natures to join an organization. The latter effect is called the 
ante-incentive effect while the former is named post-incentive effect of a reward structure. 
Our problem is how to have an incentive structure and selection process so that suitable 
people will be induced to participate in a polity to exercise political power for the benefits of 
the whole society.9 Solving this problem implies that the agency costs of the CFA will be 
greatly lowered and the long-lasting problem of ‘who watches the watcher’ in the political 
power allocation process will be largely reduced. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Brennan and Pettit (2004). The demanders are the rich, able and/or benevolent persons desired to serve society 
while the suppliers are the poor, needy and the public in general. In the exchange process, quality social goods 
and services are produced, and the social and political leaders with desirable characteristics and publicity emerge 
who enter the channel to coercive power. Altruistic behaviors are encouraged and socially rewarded 
automatically. The comparison of the self-organizing nature between the market system and the Social Branch 
System is provided in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
9 The importance of human nature diversity and its implication are increasingly recognized by political 
economists. For instance, in Brennan and Hamlin (2000), Brennan and Pettit (2004), their discussions are based 
on the assumption that the desires for property, power, prestige or status or esteem are the three ruling passions in 
human life. In our design, the market sphere determines the allocation of property and income given the structure 
of primary institution. The Social Branch system provides the market for esteem, power, prestige and public 
recognition. The whole system defines a market for allocating political power which can accomplish the 
universal interests in the competition process. 
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 In the design of primary institution and organizations, the ante-incentive effect 
is of utmost importance as the institution determines the allocation of coercive force. 
Politicians empowered with coercive force mean that it will be very expensive for controlling 
their rent-seeking activities. Being able to have social-oriented agents as the CFA and political 
leaders will substantially reduces the possibility of ruling exploiters and the potentially 
enormous monitoring and agency costs caused by the egoistic behavior of crooked state 
leaders. The question is what characteristics and process of the incentive system can result in 
the selection of social-oriented agents to serve as political leaders.10 
 In an electoral democratic polity, the ante-incentive to participate in the 
vote-maximizing activities are the ‘rewards’ generated from the possession of political power. 
The reward structure to the elected politicians depends on their individual specific preference. 
If the leader is motivated by material rewards, she will use her political power to change the 
reward structure for maximizing the rent to be earned from her ruling position.11 If the leader 
is an altruist, she will use the coercive force to serve the benefits of the society according to 
her subjective judgments. The existing electoral democracies have no mechanism to guarantee 
that the elected politician will serve the benefits of the society rather than her own egoistic 
interests. Check and balance mechanism embodied in constitution and/or organization 
structure is therefore vital for constraining the potential rent-seeking behavior of crooked 
politicians. However, the quality of public governance is itself a public good where free-rider 
problems and tragedy of commons prevail. Relying on the check and balance mechanism for 
the proper behavior of political leaders is doomed to fail in the long-run. By imposing that all 
                                                 
10 Altruistic and social-oriented human nature can be a survival characteristic during human evolution (for 
instance, Becker, 1976, among many others). If the egoistic nature of human being is the survival trait of lone 
competition, the social-oriented nature of human being is the survival trait of 
family/group/tribal/village/state/national organized competition. Groups with social-oriented members 
substantially lower coordination costs and therefore raise the competitiveness of the groups relative to the groups 
with egoistic members. To our best knowledge, the ‘ante-incentive effect’ of reward structure is firstly suggested 
in Brennan (1996), although the idea is closely related to the concept of self-selection. 
11 Under normal situations, the post-incentive structure is exogenous to an agent’s preference as the agent has no 
power to change the incentive structure. However, agents controlling coercive force can alter institutions that 
include her reward and income structure according to her preference. 
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CFA in the Social Congress have to be selected from the leaders in the Social Branches and 
SSO, we institute an ante-incentive structure and screening process that will raise the 
likelihood of having persons of desirable characteristics to exercise the function of political 
power allocation. In addition, the basic rule of the reward structure in our polity is that all 
leaders of the political and social organizations that do not bear responsibility for daily 
operation are only provided with symbolic/supportive material rewards. Under this reward 
scheme, the egoistic rent-seekers driven by material concerns will find no substantial 
incentive to participate in the political activities.12 With a proper screening mechanism, we 
can select proper persons for exercising the political power in the Social Congress and Public 
Pillar from the pool of benevolent candidates among the leaders in the Social Branches and 
SSO. 
Persons with similar backgrounds and/or preference tend to gather in respective 
Social Branches. The sense of identity will develop among the leading members. This will 
promote inter-comparison, competition and imitation among the Branches. The competition 
between the Branches to perform their social role will foster the pace of dynamic adjustment, 
efficiency, and technical advances in the social sphere. Moreover, when each Social Branch is 
empowered to organize and administer SSO, the demand for skills and problem solving will 
spread rationality, real world understandings and practical experiences to the decision makers. 
In this way, it will be much easier for all leaders in the Social Branches to arrive at consensus 
about public issues, even though they have very diverse backgrounds. The ante-incentive 
effects, self-selection, organization selection and practical experiences pervasive to the 
leaders in Social Branches will result in social decisions to be based on rationality, efficiency 
and the universal interest of society. Moreover, the infiltration of the Social Branches deep 
                                                 
12 Suppose we have two types of agents, the egoist who cares about material rewards only and the socialist who 
cares about the universal interests of the society. Their preferences are respectively Ue (Rm, Rs) and Us (Rm, Rs) 
where Rm , Rs is the vector of material rewards and social rewards respectively. Since the socialists have strong 
preference on the social rewards and the egoists vice versa. A reward structure that is dominantly composed of 
social rewards will induce ‘socialists’ to join the social organizations and the egoists are self-excluded. Brennan 
(1996 ) provides a related graphical exposition. 
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into social substrates implies that these benefits will be pervasive to all levels of society, 
particularly those poor and needy. The Branches provide widespread social and political 
participatory opportunities for a wide spectrum of income classes, ethnic groups and religious 
backgrounds. They provide platforms for people of different ideologies, beliefs, and interests 
to interact with and understand each other.  
In this arrangement, the rich social-oriented leaders attain satisfaction through 
providing quality social services to the community while egoistic rent-seekers may also be 
induced to provide social services in order to access political power. The Social Branches 
therefore provide essential platforms for income redistribution process and therefore reduce 
potential social conflicts generated by market outcomes. Through the Social Branches, the 
wealth generated by successful market ventures can be effectively ploughed back for the 
benefits of the poor and needy. The contributors, either serving as donors and/or leaders, not 
only receive social rewards but are also more able to protect their wealth by earning public 
influence and promoting social stability that are particularly valuable to rich families and 
enterprises. In general, each Branch will perform various social functions and receive stable 
material supports through private donations and government matching grants. Under the 
structure, an automatic income redistribution mechanism is instituted when the whole society 
is wired up by a dynamic, self-organizing built-in social security system. Politics is no longer 
a power game as in the electoral democracy but a competition for contributing to the universal 
interests of society. The state can be released from its role as the providers of the social 
services and concentrate on its vital functions. The efficiency of the social and political 
spheres will be substantially increased.  
 
2.3  The Social Pillars: Public, Rational and Full-Bright Pillars 
The competition process among the Branches generates a pool of potential 
benevolent candidates to sit in the Social Congress. A major function of the Social Congress is 
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to regularly nominate candidates to serve in the Public, Rational and Full-Bright Pillars. The 
nominee will be screened by all existing Pillars’ Directors and the Chief Executive. The 
short-listed will then be circulated around the Members of the Pillars, Social Congress, 
Branches and general public to seek their approval votes. If a short-listed candidate attains a 
qualified level of approval and no legitimate objections are received, then the candidate will 
become the members of the designated Pillar. Each Pillar chooses its own Directors. Although 
all Directors of the Pillars will serve as the Supreme Board Members who discuss, advice, 
propose and approve laws, the Pillars have some division of labor. The Public Pillar normally 
harbors the members from the Social Branches. They can therefore understand the problems 
of the society, the actual operation and condition of the economy, the impact of the laws on 
the poor and the universal interests of the general public. Their connections down to the 
bottom of the market and social substrates will ensure that law will not be impractical and 
damaging to the productivity and harmony of the society.  
The Rational Pillar is intended to harbor talented individuals who achieve 
outstanding academic recognition, social-minded and have a general understanding on the 
mechanisms of the society and economy.13 It can serve as the source and connections to 
acquire various highly specialized knowledge and technology. The Pillar can therefore 
provide theoretical supports, analyses and professional viewpoints in the legislative process. 
The Full-Bright Pillar is intended to harbor seniors of exceptional prestige from 
all walks of life, particularly the seniors with exceptional social recognition from all Pillars, 
Social Branches and SSO. This Pillar can serve as the arbitrator between the worldly wisdoms 
in the Public Pillar and the academic insights in the Rational Pillar. The high social 
recognition, extensive social connection and experiences of the members will make the Pillar 
to be the equalizer in cases of pervasive social disputes. The Directors from all Pillars form 
the Supreme Board for legislative function. The structure of Supreme Board provides an 
                                                 
13 The quality of the members in the Rational Pillar is guaranteed by the merit-based selection process in the 
academic arena. 
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interface for public concerns, political and operational feasibility, wisdom and knowledge to 
generate rational legislative decisions for attaining the universal interests of society. Again, 
only symbolic/supportive material rewards are entitled by the Members and Directors of the 
Social Pillars. Also, no special interests should be pursued in the Pillars and Supreme Board. 
All decisions, challenges and discussions must be based on universal interests.  
 
2.4. The Operation Pillars: Executive and Judicial Pillars 
The Operation Pillars include the Executive and Judicial Pillars. They are 
operational in nature. Instead of relying on the self-organizing competition in the Social 
Branches and the nomination/approval procedure in the Social Pillars to generate their 
Directors and members, the Operation Pillars rely on merit-based organizational structure to 
generate their Directors and Members. One reason is that these Directors must have a full 
understanding on the logistics of the organizations and specific rules to be followed for 
accomplishing their operational duties. The civil administrators are recruited from the best 
graduates of the best universities. During their service, they accumulate substantial 
job-specific investments and build-up a sense of belonging to their respective Pillar. If a strict 
merit-based recruitment procedure is successfully instituted, the Pillars can generate 
appropriate candidates for their own Directors internally. The candidates for the Directors will 
go through the approval procedure by the Directors and members of the other Pillars, Social 
Congress and Branches. In the Operation Pillars, all members bear daily administrative 
responsibilities and will be paid market-matching material rewards. In order to raise the 
contestability and reduce the potential agency costs in the bureaucratic systems, the Directors 
of the Operation Pillars can also be nominated from the members of other Pillar or Branches 
with a standard approval procedure when deemed appropriate. 
The Directors of the Operation Pillars are top civil servants who are the experts 
and specialists. They have been handling practical problems in the government for many 
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years, and they know the answers and have the reasons for their practices. Therefore, with 
their presence in the Supreme Board, legislative decisions can be made with reliable support 
and advice about the operational practicability provided by the Operation Pillars.  
 In order to reinforce the merit-based criteria in each Pillar in recruiting 
members, each Pillar is obliged to nominate at least one candidate from its members to be 
selected for the Chief Executive when required. The pool of the candidates will go through 
the approval procedure of different levels: the levels of the whole society, of Directors in SSO, 
of the Social Branches Directors, of the Members of the Pillars and finally of the Pillars 
Directors. The approval rates of each level will be reported. A formula for weighting the 
approval rates of different levels can be devised and result in an index determining the 
appointment of the Chief Executive. In the current democratic systems, children, aliens, the 
mentally ill, and criminals are almost always barred from voting, on the assumption that they 
are unable to make reasonable choices on collective matters or that they do not share 
substantial common interests with the other members of the community. However, as the 
whole society approval voting is not decisive in this Rational Democratic system, we can 
allow and encourage as much participation as possible in this voting level for enhancing the 
sense of belonging to all people. The approval procedure by widespread and diverse 
‘stakeholders’ with different levels of information, ability and knowledge can release the 
pressure of special interest groups on the decisions of Chief Executive and at the same time, 
serve as a symbolic function that she should serve for the universal interest of the whole 
society. In order to evaluate the performance of the selection method and soliciting 
information to revise and improve the selection formula, in contemporary with the approval 
procedure of a new Chief Executive, the same evaluation/approval exercise will be done to 
every retiring Chief Executive. 
 In order to instill rationality and provide supports for quality decision-making, 
it will be ideal if each Pillar can have a university under its supervision. Consensus can be 
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easily arrived if decisions are based on knowledge and rationality. Regular collective 
international conferences on public issues among the universities can be conducted as a 
standard mechanism for rational discussions and arriving consensus among the Pillars, Social 
Congress and Branches. The knowledge on public issues and the traditions of rationality will 
become stronger over time. This arrangement will further enhance the quality of public 
decision-making, in addition to having political leaders of super personal traits, of 
commanding respect and of being able to find innovative solutions. 
 To summarize, in order to raise the chance of having political leaders of 
desirable characteristics in the system, we should have the following arrangements: 
a. raise the costs and reduce the benefits to rent-seeking political participants. No special 
interests are allowed in the Social and Political Spheres. 
b. in the cases of Public and Full-Bright Pillars, their Members must have a strong track 
record of contributions to social services in the Branches and/or substantial contributions 
to the society in their respective arena. 
c. in the case of Rational Pillar, the Members should be known to have high personal 
integrity and to have gained substantial level of academic achievement and/or a self-made 
man of high social recognition. 
d. all members of the Social Congress, Full-Bright, Public and Rational Pillars receive 
zero/supportive material rewards only. However, they are empowered to allocate and/or 
control political power that is vital for the proper functioning of a society. 
 
3. The Supervision Boards and Uprooting Mechanisms 
In the society, all individuals have the right to set up Social Branches. However, 
only when the number of members in their SSO is up to a qualified level, a matching grant 
mechanism will be initiated. Reversely, the matching grant from the government will drop and 
finally vanish if the number of their SSO Members declines. The rise and decline of the 
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Branches therefore depend on their supports received from their donors and members in their 
SSO which in turn depends on the types, quality and effectiveness of their social services 
provided. This uprooting mechanism through competition will induce and force the leaders to 
be careful about reputation, righteous and restraining power abuses. The keen competition in 
benevolence, merits and effectiveness will guarantee the best Branches and Social Leaders to 
emerge and dominate the Social Congress. The Social Branches can be left basically 
self-organizing. However, this self-regulating process is not available among the Pillars.  
 
3.1 Organization Vicious Cycle 
Once an organization is set up, information asymmetry and monitoring costs 
imply that each insider has substantial residual power to pursue her own self-interests that can 
be damaging to the functions/targets of the organization. This can result in corruption, 
shirking and inertia inside organizations. Moreover, all organizations can be plagued by 
vicious cycles of occasional crooked leaders. 14  Therefore, both public and private 
bureaucracies have internal tendencies to increase inefficiencies in forms of excessive growth, 
diminished effort, excessive complication of procedures etc.. Market organizations evolve, die, 
grow, innovate and improve in the competition process while public organizations tend to be 
much longer-lasting and have much slower improvements due to the lack of competition. 
Unlike the Market and Social Spheres, there is no automatic competitive mechanism to 
guarantee the efficiency of the organizations inside the Pillars. A systematic way is therefore 
required to prevent, detect and rectify the agency problems and vicious interests developed in 
the Pillar organizations. 
Organizations that control coercive force in a state render the potential 
damages of the agency problem particularly pervasive and significant. For the sake of 
                                                 
14 Once a crooked administrator takes hold in an organization, the self-interest of the crooked administrator will 
invite persons of her type into the organization for reinforcing her position. This will start a vicious cycle such 
that crooked people keep moving in while good persons leave the organization. Finally, the vicious interests 
dominate the organization that operate farther and farther away the interest of the principal. 
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convenience, we classify the political agency costs into several types: a. slack agency cost: 
resources are underutilized and socially productive investments are under-provided; b. 
abusive agency cost: under-maintenance and/or employing public resources for private 
benefits; c. corruption cost: using residual political power to trade public interests for private 
interests; d. exploitative agency cost: using coercive power to change institutions and/or 
weaken the principal and/or limit the flow of information in order to maintain their incumbent 
position.15 Our problem is how to rectify these agency problems in the political sphere. 
 
3.2. A Balanced and Open Society 
Certain fundamentals common to every democracy which include private 
property rights, freedom of opinion, expression, press, travel and organizations, independent 
legal and court system, nonpolitical police and armed forces etc. are to be retained and 
explicitly written down in a constitution. The free flow of information generates public 
pressure against any illegitimate use of coercive forces and inefficiencies in the state. The 
Branches and SSO provide channels for the flow of information, knowledge, expectations and 
rationality between social substrate and the leaders of the state. They therefore generate 
constant informed challenges and organized pressure against the state. Moreover, checks and 
supports are instituted among the five Pillars by the horizontal division of powers. The 
arrangements inherit the spirit of modern democracy: open society and divisions of powers as 
the means of reducing the agency costs in political organizations. 
 
3.3. The Supervision Bureaus and Uprooting Mechanism 
The inherent failures in the public sectors imply that some supervision 
organizations and uprooting mechanism are required. They include the Efficiency and 
Corruption Supervision Bureaus. The Bureau Directors must be nominated by the Social 
                                                 
15 The agency costs and government failures generated from political organizations are exemplified in the 
history of imperial China. (for instance, Mo, 1995, 2004, 2007). 
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Congress. The nominees have to pass through a standard screening and selection process 
based on their characteristics and track records. The selected candidate has to seek approval 
from all Branch Leaders. The function of the Efficiency and Corruption Bureaus is to rectify 
the potential agency problems in the Pillars. Moreover, in order to provide incentive to the 
Branches and individuals to look into the possible agency problems in the Pillars, the 
Congress and Bureaus can provide rewards to the Branches and/or individuals when they 
contribute to improve the efficiency and/or rectify corruption activities in the government and 
Pillars.  
Another important function of the Bureaus, Social Congress and Branches is to 
initiate and process an uprooting procedure to the Pillars. In the absence of competitions, 
organizational agency problems result in rigidity and throttle the productivity improvement 
that lies behind social and economic advancements. Moreover, once a convention or norm is 
established in an organization, other institutions and organizations evolve as 
complementariness. A strong complementary of institutions and organizations means that 
changes have to be made in blocks. When deemed necessary, the Social Congress and 
Bureaus can initiate an uprooting procedure such that all members of the related Pillar have to 
be retired and start a new nomination and approval procedures for appointing new 
membership of the Pillar. The possibility of the procedure extends constant pressure on the 
Pillars to perform effectively. 
With these loops of checks and supports between political organizations and 
Social Branches plus the competitive environment in the Social and Market Spheres, the 
political system is closed. The Social Branches are supported and checked by the Political and 
Market Spheres. Their survival is dictated by the supports from the poor, needy and general 
public to whom they serve. The coercive force and the political agency costs of the state are 
constrained by the self-disciplined dynamic Social Sphere.16  
                                                 
16 Please refer to Figure A1 and A2 for a comparison between the ‘checks and supports’ mechanism among the 
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3.4. Constitutional Review 
The foundation governing the system is the constitution. It defines the 
objectives of the system, the source of political power and its allocation method. In particular, 
who has the rights to use the coercive force to make laws, the legislative function; to enforce 
laws, the executive function and to interpret laws, the judicial function and how the powers to 
be constrained. The constant evolving technology, social and economic environment imply 
that the constitution needs to be reviewed and adjusted according to new conditions for 
maintaining its efficiency. Regular review also provides opportunities to summarize the 
experiences, problems and to perfect the system after it is implemented. It can also be a public 
education process for refreshing the spirit of the system and document its evolution process. 
Since altering constitutions can be exploited by incumbents in favor of their interests, the 
review should be carried out only when the political leaders received pervasive public 
supports. Any constitutional change must be based on universal interests with encompassing 
studies, ample supportive reasoning and evidence, and has to be reviewed carefully and 
receive high approval level. 
 
4. The Merits and Outcomes of Rational Democracy 
4.1 Quality of Public Policy 
One of the major functions of political leaders is engineering social and 
economic development which is a highly professional task. Frontier visions and knowledge, 
by definition, are only acquired by minorities. Under the dictate of majority in an electoral 
democracy, only when such visions and knowledge become the consensus of the majority will 
they be incorporated in public policies. In the case of rational democracy, the frontier 
knowledge and visions will be more likely to be adopted in public policies as the state is 
directed by social-oriented meritorious experts.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Spheres in the Rational and Electoral democratic political systems. 
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4.2. Harmony between the Market and Social Spheres 
The market leaders in the economy, driven by their self-interest, have 
incentives to maintain social order and stability through the redistribution mechanism 
provided by the Social Branches. The conflicts between primary distribution and secondary 
distribution can be resolved due to the constant interaction, adjustments and voluntary flow of 
resources from the market to the social sphere. Economic and social activities are the most 
important part of public lives which fulfill people’s daily material and emotional needs. The 
strong, self-organizing market and social organizations allowed in this system will cater the 
needs of people with dynamic efficiency. 
 
4.2 The Self-Creating and Self-Organizing Social Sphere 
Modern governments involve heavily in the social sphere which creates 
enormous inefficiencies. In our system, the leaders of the Social Branches are responsible for 
the quality of their social services. They have intimate and persistent interaction among 
themselves and with their SSO members. It is these informed members who select their 
respective social and potential political leaders. The competition between the Branches by the 
introduction of mimic markets compels learning and adaptation of the social organizations in 
an uncertain and evolving environment. 
 
4.3 Quality of Political Leaders and Agency Cost 
The system provides ample chances to social-oriented persons for 
self-actualization and they are self-selected and delegated with coercive power according to 
their merits of being able to serve for the benefits of the society. Political leaders are selected 
not by their popularity among uninformed public and informed special interest groups, but by 
a systematic self-selection, ‘market-selection’, nomination, inspection and screening by 
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informed agents and finally approved by the general public. We can therefore achieve ‘what is 
good for political leaders will be good for the country’. This alignment of the social interest 
and the ‘preference actualization’ of the social-oriented political leaders can minimize the 
agency costs in the political system. Allocation of coercive power is so dangerous such that 
informed selection of persons with desirable characteristics is very important. 
 
4.5 Resolving ‘Preference Aggregation’ in Collective Decisions 
The problem of aggregating preference in collective decisions can be resolved 
under the convention that public policy should target at pursuing universal interests. 
Consensus among people is generated through the ‘universal interest politics’ in the Social 
Branches and Pillars. Leaders with public approval, trust and desirable characteristics will 
make collective decisions much easier to be reached and policies effectively implemented. 
The politics, society and economy are closely interweaved, balanced and mutually supported 
for the collective benefits of the society. 
 
4.6 Formation and Accumulation of Social Capital 
We harness the political competition process for the social benefits by setting 
up the Social Branch system. Under the political selection process through Social Branch 
competition, both genuine and simulated altruistic behaviors are motivated. In addition to the 
networking and social security functions of the Social Branches, they can substantially 
promote trust and cooperation among people. The widespread participatory opportunities in 
social and political activities can enhance rationality, knowledge accumulation, consensus, 
stability, flexibility, independency as well as cohesiveness in the society.17 
 
                                                 
17 It seems that there is substantial connection between social harmony and development with social capital. 
(Putnam, 2000) In our system, the withdrawal of government from direct production of social services will make 
private networks, trust and honest more valuable to the people than otherwise. This will encourage the formation 
of social capital and civic engagements motivated by private interest. 
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4.7 Minimal Requirements for the Success of the System 
A vibrant market economy and strong non-state organizations are helpful for 
the operation of the Rational Democracy. However, it requires no more basic social 
infrastructure than electoral democracy for it to function. The dynamic interactions under the 
system will enrich the social substrate and enhance advancements in all spheres over time. 
The political participation channel provided by the Social Branches encourages the formation 
of productive networks, norms, and trust that enable people to act together more effectively to 
pursue socially desirable objectives. The system is flexible enough that it can promote 
universal interests and harmony of a state irrespective of differences in people’s ethnic 
compositions, social problems, religious backgrounds and historical experience. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Among the three spheres of human societies, it is the political sphere that has 
experienced the least progress over the past two thousand years. In terms of catering to the 
needs of the society, the participatory democracy of Athens and the constitutional 
authoritarianism of the Roman Republic were more effective in the allocation of coercive 
force than most modern governments. Modern states are, in many cases, unresponsive to their 
people, abusive of power, corrupt, wasteful, exploitative, and/or ineffective in promoting the 
universal interests of their society. The allocation of coercive force is the most important 
unsolved problem of modern societies. As suggested in Chua (2003), in most economies the 
conflicts between the primary and secondary institutions can be the chief reason for their 
downturn and chaos in the coming centuries. 
An effective market system is essential for the development of an economy – a 
system defines, respects and protects private property rights, allows free exchanges, mobility 
of resources and flow of information. The competition and comparison between the capitalist 
and communist economies in recent decades have generated substantial supportive empirical 
 25
evidence. Any desirable and sustainable political system must not seriously damage the 
market mechanism. Under the Rational Democracy, the market, social and political spheres 
check as well as supplement each other. The competing Social Branches and SSO driven by 
self-actualization and the struggle for political power reduce the problems caused by income 
disparities generated by market competitions and amend the possible social cleavages 
between religious and language groups. At the same time, the economic growth and 
development generated by market competitions provide resources, income and talent for 
supporting the political and social spheres. In the process, persons of desirable characteristic 
will be self-selected, publicized, nominated and approved to be political leaders. The Rational 
Democratic System is ‘motivation-compatible’ in the sense that the self-interest maximization 
of all agents operating under the system of rules and organizations will automatically result in 
the accomplishment of universal interests.  
It is a broad-based democratic system. Everyone has the right and ample 
opportunities to participate in politics. The pervasive market and social organizations allow 
people to have ample experience with self-government, and with the expectations of 
autonomy and freedom from the state interventions. There are evidences and common 
perception that the goals of simultaneous advancements of economic development, 
socio-economic equality, and broad-based democracy are not compatible. Our design not only 
allows the accomplishment of the three goals but the goals actually enhance each other and 
therefore the system will be stable and self-perpetuating. In general, Rational Democracy can 
attain certain desirable characteristics that include democratic participation, serving for 
universal interest, public sector efficiency, and sustainable by incentive compatibility and 
virtuous cycles. It is a system that serves the people, rules by rationality, strives for efficiency 
and promotes harmony between market and social spheres. They will drive the society toward 
harmony and rapid growth in the quality of life for all. 
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Appendixes:  
 
Table A1:  The Comparison of Electoral and Rational Democracy 
 
Characteristics & 
Outcomes 
Rational Democratic Polity Electoral Democratic Polity 
Political Sphere 
Source of power From the public; represented by 
Social Branches, Pillars and general 
public 
From the public; represented by 
eligible majority 
Leaders selection 
mechanism 
Continuous and lengthy interactions, 
informed and merit base selection 
Short-term and periodic 
interactions, limited information  
Quality of leaders Social-oriented and quality proof , 
lengthy screening process with 
informed nomination and selection 
Unreliable quality, selected 
according to popularity and special 
interest politics  
Autonomy of public 
policy 
Free from special interest politics; 
directed by rationality and universal 
interest 
Heavily influenced by special 
interest politics 
Succession of political 
leaders 
Orderly and merit-based; very low 
social disturbances 
Varies; partisan-based; campaign 
and lobbying costs 
Uprooting mechanism Regular among all spheres; low 
adjustment cost 
Regular in political and market 
spheres; adjustment cost varies 
Checks and balances Informed, organization-based  Organization and partisan based 
Lobbying activities Prohibited Prevailing; trading public interests 
for special interests 
Policy consistency & 
coherence 
Directed by rationality and universal 
interest 
Directed by popularity and partisan 
interest 
Social & Market Spheres 
Individual freedom  Strong Strong 
Market compatibility Strong; mutual supports between 
market and social spheres 
Weak; special interests expropriate 
market surplus through political 
activities 
Extent of people 
self-governing 
Strong; small and limited government Relatively weak; large and 
pervasive government 
Social harmony; 
preference aggregation 
Governed through consensus 
formation; conflicts resolving 
Struggles among special interests; 
conflicts generating 
Social organizations Organized for social functions; 
dynamic, open and interactive 
Organized for special interests; 
closed and isolated 
 27
Social capital Pervasive autonomous social 
organizations; accumulation of social 
capital overtime 
Pervasive public social services; 
social capital disintegrates overtime
Behavioral norms Promote generic and simulated 
altruistic behavior in all spheres 
Promote self-interest pursuing in all 
spheres 
Quantity and quality 
of social leaders 
Large, diverse and social-oriented Varies and special-interest oriented 
Stability & 
sustainability 
Strong; virtuous cycle among spheres Varies; vicious cycle among spheres
Coherence of public 
environment 
Strong and stable Highly affected by partisan interest; 
can be erratic 
Growth promoting Strong Weak 
 
 
 
Table A2 
Comparison of Competitive Market and the Social Branch System 
 
Competitive Market Social Branch System 
Competition for profit and SIM of producers 
minimize the cost of production and attain 
allocative efficiency in private goods 
Competition for coercive power and SIM of 
social agents minimize the cost of production and 
attain allocative efficiency in social services 
Efficient and innovative producers survive Efficient, innovative and altruistic social service 
providers and leaders survive 
SIM of consumers generate information on the 
value of private goods 
SIM of social service users reveal their preference 
on social services; their choices and interactions 
reveal the quality of social leaders 
Enhance economic development; undesirable 
income distribution normally results; market 
leaders evolve 
Enhance overall development and social 
harmony; reduce social disparities; pragmatic and 
altruistic social and political leaders evolve 
Note: 
SIM: Self-interest maximization 
 
 
 
 28
Figure A1:  
Checks and Supports among Spheres: Electoral Democracy 
 
Notes: 
PSs , PMs / PSc , PMc : Political Sphere supports/checks the Social and Market Spheres by 
formulating and enforcing institutions, providing public goods, funding and 
infrastructures. 
SPs , SMs : Social Sphere supports the Political and Market Spheres by providing social 
services to maintain political and social harmony.  
MPs : Market Sphere supports the Political Sphere by providing tax revenues. 
Checks from the public: Electoral voting as a check to the Political Sphere from the general 
public that suffers from various market failures in the process. 
 
PSs ; PSc 
SPs  
PMs ; PMc 
MPs  SMs  
Market Sphere 
 
Political Sphere 
Social Sphere 
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Figure A2: 
Checks and Supports among Spheres: Rational Democracy 
 
Notes: 
PSs , PMs / PSc , PMc : Political Sphere supports/checks the Social and Market Spheres by 
formulating and enforcing institutions, providing public goods, funding and infrastructures. 
SPs , SMs : Social Sphere supports the Political and Market Spheres by providing effective 
social services, maintaining social stability, training a pool of potential social and political 
leaders and nominating political leaders.  
MSs , MSc : Market Sphere supports and checks the Social Sphere by direct participation, 
and/or providing/withholding financial supports. 
MPs : Market Sphere supports the Political Sphere by providing tax revenues. 
SPc : Social Sphere checks the Political Sphere through the uprooting mechanism, supervision 
bureaus, nominating and approving political leaders. 
Checks from the public: Approval mechanism as a check to the Political Sphere from the 
public; the public also checks the behaviors of the Social and Market Spheres through 
‘voting by feet’. 
In general, Rational Democracy substantially extends the influences of the Market on the 
Social Sphere. At the same time, it also put the self-regulating Social Sphere as the capstone 
in the society. The influences of the self-regulating spheres of the society are substantially 
extended in comparing to the existing democratic regimes. 
PSs ; PSc 
SPs ; SPc  
PMs ; PMc 
MPs  SMs  
MSs ; MSc 
Social Sphere 
 
Market Sphere 
 
Political Sphere 
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